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RECENT DECISIONS
CIVIL PROCEDURE--ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE MONTANA SUPREME
COURT-DECLARATORY JUDGMENTs-On April 26, 1956, pursuant to chapter
278 Laws of 1955, the Montana Board of Examiners passed a resolution pro-
viding for issuance and sale of bonds to be drawn on the Capitol Building
Land Grant Fund, for the purpose of renovating the state capitol building
and purchasing and installing a roll call voting machine in the House of
Representatives. A test case was sought by prospective purchasers, and on
June 4, 1956, an action was commenced by a taxpayer against the Board
praying the bond issue be enjoined and declared invalid. On appeal to the
Montana Supreme Court, after a finding in the trial court for defendant
Board, the question presented was whether the authority to "erect" as con-
ferred by the Enabling Act was strictly limited to erecting new structures
or whether authority thereunder might not also extend to renovation, repair,
and installation of fixtures. On December 7, 1956, in Bryant v. Board of Ex-
aminers,' the court held the Enabling Act was to be strictly construed, and
the judgment was reversed with directions to award plaintiff the relief de-
manded. Justice Davis wrote the opinion of the court, Justices Bottomly
and Adair concurred, Justice Anderson did not record his decision, and
Justice Angstman dissented.
Thereafter, two vacancies having occurred on the court,' James T. Har-
rison was appointed chief justice and Wesley Castles associate justice, each
assuming his respective office on January 7, 1957. On February 2, 1957,
the Board of Examiners passed a resolution that it issue bonds in the
amount of $25,000 for the purpose of satisfying indebtedness already in-
curred, to be paid from the Capitol Building Land Grant Fund pursuant
to chapter 278, Laws of 1955. On February 5, 1957, an original petition
was filed in the Supreme Court by the taxpayer plaintiff against the Board
of Examiners praying an injunction and declaratory judgment. The com-
plaint alleged two causes of action substantially to the effect that, even
though the Supreme Court of Montana in Bryant v. Board of Examiners
declared chapter 278, Laws of 1955 invalid, the defendant Board passed
another resolution thereunder authorizing the issuance of more bonds; that
the board had incurred other expenditures, and that it believed the decision
in the Bryant case should be reconsidered. Original jurisdiction was based
on the proposition that speedy determination of the questions was necessary
so that legislature action by the assembly then in session could be sought
before adjournment, if necessary. In the Montana Supreme Court, held,
'Sections 12, 17.
2305 P.2d 340 (Mont. 1956). Respondents moved for a rehearing which was sub-
sequently denied, caused the record to be certified to the Supreme Court of the
United States, and secured the drafting of a bill amending the Enabling Act to in-
clude repair and maintenance to be submitted to the Congress of the United States
and the Montana legislature. The amending bill in Congress subsequently passed
the House February 18, 1957, the Senate February 21, and was signed by the Presi-
dent on February 26. The act in the Montana legislature passed the House March
1, 1957, the Senate on March 5, and was signed into law by the Governor on March
9, 1957.
'Chief Justice Adair resigned from that position and was elected to the office of
associate justice on the expiration of Justice Davis' tern. Justice Anderson re-
signed his office upon being elected attorney general,
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petition dismissed, but the authority to erect under the Enabling Act con-
fers also the power to maintain existing structures and to install a roll call
voting machine. The Enabling Act must be liberally construed and Bryant
v. Board of Examiners is expressly overruled. State ex rel. Morgan v.
Board of Examiners, 309 P.2d 336 (Mont. 1957) (Justices Adair and Bot-
tomly dissenting).
The dissent in very positive terms sets out that no jurisdiction exists
in the supreme court to hear original petitions for declaratory relief. The
majority opinion, by Justice Angstman, anticipating this criticism, blandly
states that the question need not be decided since an injunction also was
sought, there being express constitutional authority for original injunction
proceedings. Although not decided, the question is thus presented whether
the Supreme Court of Montana has original jurisdiction to hear petitions
for declaratory judgment. While other aspects of the decision are well
worth comment, this discussion will necessarily be confined to the problem
of original jurisdiction.
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, contained in chapter 89 of
title 93, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, confers no additional jurisdiction
on the court. Section 93-8901 provides, "Courts of record within their re-
spective jurisdictions shall have power to declare. . . ." Thus, it is clear
that the court must establish its jurisdiction without reference to this act."
The Montana Constitution in article 8, section 3, provides :'
"The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to
all cases at law and in equity, subject, however to such limitations
and regulations as may be prescribed by law. Said court shall have
power in its discretion to issue and to hear and determine writs of
habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition
and injunction, and such other original and remedial writs as may
be necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jur-
isdiction .... '
Except as otherwise provided in the constitution, the Supreme Court of
Montana has appellate jurisdiction only,' and the six enumerated writs are
the limit of the court's purely original jurisdiction
Mr. Justice Adair's position, then, is that since there is no express men-
tion of the declaratory judgment in the constitution no basis exists for the
'For a full discussion of the application of this act in Montana see Note, 2 MONTANA
L. REV. 106 (1941) and Note, 8 MONTANA L. REV. 57 (1947).
5See also REvisED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 93-214 which is substantially a codifica-
tion of the original jurisdiction provisions contained in this section of the con-
stitution.
OAnother criterion to be considered is Rule IV, Supreme Court Rules, which pro-
vides:
"This is an appellate court but it is empowered by the Constitution of Montana
to hear and determine such original and remedial writs as may be necessary or
proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The institution of such
original proceedings in this Court is sometimes justified by circumstances of an
emergency nature, as when a cause of action has arisen under conditions making
due consideration in the trial courts and a due appeal to this court an inadequate
remedy, or when supervision of a trial court other than by appeal Is deemed neces-
sary and proper."
'State ex rel. Scharnikow v. Hogan, 24 Mont. 379, 62 Pac. 493 (1900).
8Willis v. Pilot Butte Mining Co., 58 Mont. 26, 190 Pac. 124 (1920).
19571
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court's assumption of jurisdiction over such actions except in its appellate
function which, he contends, is not being exercised in this case. But the
phrase "such other original and remedial writs as may be necessary or
proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction" has on numer-
ous occasions been the basis for the assumption of original jurisdiction by
the court. More specifically, in at least three instances the court has heard
original petitions for declaratory judgment and has granted the relief
prayed on the ground it was necessary and proper to the complete exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction. In the case of Gullickson v. Mitchell,' plaintiff
had been appointed "Acting Attorney General" during the absence of At-
torney General Bonner, who was in military service. When his authority
was challenged he sought a judicial determination of the question under
the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. The court assumed original juris-
diction as necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jur-
isdiction, "since the importance and urgency of the questions presented are
apparent."
Bottomly v. Meagher Coutnty'° was a controversy between the State of
Montana and Meagher County as to which should receive the proceeds of a
certain estate. The plaintiff attorney general sought declaratory relief in
an original action before the supreme court, and original jurisdiction was
accepted under section 3, article 8 of the Constitution on the reasoning that
it was necessary and proper to the complete exercise of the court's appellate
jurisdiction since the final judgment might have required further enact-
ments by the legislative assembly then convened, and the ordinary appellate
process would not have been timely under the circumstances.
Carey v. McFatridgeu is similar. In that case the court assumed origi-
nal jurisdiction of a petition for declaratory judgment to determine the
duties of the state treasurer with respect to issuance of a certain draft. Here
again, the ordinary appellate procedure was deemed inadequate in view
of the "emergency" presented and original jurisdiction was again held to
be necessary and proper to the complete exercise of the court's appellate
jurisdiction.
Mr. Justice Adair's dissenting opinion in the instant case cites the
cases of Bottomly v. Meagher County, and Carey v. McFatridge, under the
heading of "Sporadic Cases." They are criticized as improperly holding
that necessity confers jurisdiction.' The Gullickson case is not cited but
'113 Mont. 359, 126 P.2d 1106 (1942).
'0114 Mont. 220, 133 P.2d 770 (1943). No true comparison can be made between the
position one takes as advocate and that which one takes as independent arbiter.
Still, it Is interesting to note that Justice Bottomly, who dissented in the instant
case on the ground there is no jurisdiction in the supreme court to hear original peti-
tions for declaratory judgment was the attorney general who sought original de-
claratory relief In Bottomly v. Meagher County.
"115 Mont. 278, 142 P.2d 229 (1943). Here also Justice Bottomly as attorney general
represented the plaintiff, and Justice Adair, then on the court, did not take Issue
with its assumption of original jurisdiction. On the contrary, in a dissenting opin-
ion he urged that the transaction in question be declared illegal and void.
"One other cogent argument which might possibly be made against such original jur-
isdiction is that the Constitution provides . . . "Original and remedial uwrits .. "
There being no writ of declaratory judgment, the framers obviously never intended
such a result. But might not a court willing to construe "erect" so as to include
reconstruction, renovating and purchase and installation of fixtures, also construe
"writ" to mean simply "relief," or some similar interpretation consistent with de-
claratory judgments?
[Vol. 19,
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would logically seem to belong with the other two. However, without com-
menting on the soundness of the reasoning, it is submitted that these three
cases and others stand as authority for the proposition that the Supreme
Court of Montana, under certain circumstances, has original jurisdiction
grounded upon its appellate function. The court has said that even with-
out objection it could not assume original jurisdiction unless authority to
do so could be found in the constitution."8 Therefore, it would seem im-
plicit in the Gullickson, Bottonly, and Carey cases that, before hearing the
petitions, the court had first decided it had original jurisdiction under the
Montana Constitution.
Moreover, it is submitted that the instant case stands for the same
proposition even though the court has not seen fit to expressly set it forth.
Here the question has been evaded with the excuse that. the petition prayed
for an injunction, a specifically enumerated writ. Yet the declaratory re-
lief sought was granted, although not eo nomine.
CHALnES C. LOVELL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESs--PYCHOLOGICALLY COERCED CON-
FEsSION-After a series of housebreakings involving rape or attempted rape,
petitioner, a 27 year old negro service station attendant, was arrested after
midnight in a white neighborhood and jailed on an "open charge of investi-
gation." Though no physical coercion was applied, petitioner was not pre-
sented for preliminary hearing but was kept practically incommunicado
for five days, during which time he was interogated two to three hours
each morning and afternoon. At that point a confession was made consist-
ing mainly of yes-or-no answers to questions, some of which were quite lead-
ing. Five more days of incarceration with continuation of the same treat-
inent culminated in a second confession. Defendant was convicted of bur-
glary with intent to rape and sentenced to death largely on the weight of
the two confessions. In connection with a pleaded defense of insanity, psy-
chiatrists testified he was a schizophrenic and highly suggestible, and his
mother testified he had always been "thickheaded," having entered school
at age eight and left at sixteen while still in the third grade. On appeal
the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. On certiorari to the Supreme
Court of the United States, held, reversed. Confessions obtained as in this
case are involuntary, notwithstanding the absence of physical brutality and
long continued interrogation, and their use is a denial of due process. Fikes
v. Alabama, 77 Sup. Ct. 281 (1957) (Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice
Brennan, concurring separately; Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Reed
and Burton, dissenting).
This is the latest in a line of cases' involving the Court's declared rule
"of. State ex rel. City of Helena v. Helena Waterworks Co., 43 Mont. 169, 115 Pac.
200 (1911).
'Principal United States Supreme Court cases in this series are: Brown v. Missis-
sippi, 299 U.S. 278 (1936); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); White v.
Texas, 310 U.S. .0 (1940); Lisbena v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Ward v.
Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Lyons v.
Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944) ; Malinsky v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) ; Haley
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